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ABSTRACT
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States Navy has been involved in many
peacekeeping and disaster relief operations worldwide. Most of these Operations Other
Than War (OOTW) have been unanticipated and therefore unbudgeted. The marked
increase in the occurrence of these contingency operations compelled Congress to
establish the Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund (OCOTF) in 1997. This
fund is used to reimburse the service components for their expenditures in support of
contingency operations. However, due to the uncertainty involved in these contingencies,
the Department of the Navy (DoN) has found it very difficult to estimate and
subsequently identify costs associated with the contingency operations. This thesis
develops a defendable method of assigning Aircraft Launch and Recovery Equipment
(ALRE) maintenance and repair costs to contingency operations based on the number of
sorties flown. The model was derived through regression analysis of catapult shots using
underway days and Primary Mission Readiness (PMR) as explanatory variables. This
model should aid the DoN in both predicting and identifying costs attributable to
contingency operations and lend credibility to the DoN's request to the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) for reimbursement.
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I. BACKGROUND/ INTRODUCTION
A. HISTORY OF THE OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS
TRANSFER FUND (OCOTF)
As U.S. spending on peacekeeping activities soared in the early 1990's, Congress
became increasingly concerned about the costs of U.N. and U.S. peacekeeping
operations. For FY91, DoD listed incremental costs for peacekeeping and related
activities in IraqlKuwait of $346.5M ($325M for Provide Comfort humanitarian
assistance programs and $21.5M in assistance to the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait
Observation Mission). For FY92, total incremental costs were $125.0M for operations in
IraqlKuwait, Somalia, ex-Yugoslavia, Haiti, Cambodia, the Western Sahara, and Angola.
Costs increased sharply in FY93 ($2.165B) due to Operation Restore Hope in Somalia
and then stayed relatively high in FY94 and FY 95 at $1.907B and $2.223B,
respectively. [Ref. 15, p.6] Increased costs created concern in Congress over the
appropriate mechanism for funding such operations.
The increase in peacekeeping operations concerned the administration as well. In
the wake of the deaths of u.S. special operations forces in Somalia in the fall of 1993,
President Clinton decided to define a more restrictive role for peacekeeping. President
Clinton outlined these tighter guidelines for u.S. military support of multilateral
peacekeeping operations in May of 1994 through Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)
25.
Under PDD 25, U.S. support of multilateral peacekeeping operations was to hinge
on whether "there is a threat to or breach of international peace and security." Situations
involving international aggression, a humanitarian disaster in a violent situation, or the
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sudden interruption of an established democracy, or gross violation of human rights were
identified as valid bases for U.S. involvement. U.S. troop involvement required further
criteria to be met, such as acceptable risks to U.S. troops, availability of resources,
essentiality of U.S. involvement for operational success, and the existence of domestic
and congressional support. Following PDD 25, debate in Congress over U.S.
involvement in peacekeeping operations intensified.
As the U.S. military was increasingly called upon to perform peacekeeping and
other non-combat missions, members of Congress questioned the effect of peacekeeping
operations upon the U.S. Armed Forces' readiness to conduct their primary mission of
combat warfare. When Defense Secretary Perry announced that several army units had
less than acceptable readiness levels in 1994, Congress' fears were affirmed. Secretary
Perry blamed the problem on a cash flow shortage created by the diversion of Operations
and Maintenance (O&M) fimds to peacekeeping and other unplanned deployments.
As a result of the growing costs and ongoing debate over the degradation of
military readiness, the l03rd and 104th Congresses sought to develop new procedures
and mechanisms for budgeting contingency operations costs. The traditional method of
funding the incremental costs that the U.S. military incurs in assisting and participating in
U.N. and other peacekeeping activities was through absorption by existing DoD budgets.
Funds were obtained through appropriation transfers or reprogramming and only
occasionally through supplemental appropriations. Although the services were
eventually reimbursed for a majority of their costs under these processes, DoD activities
still suffered because unobligated fimds were taken from other accounts (mainly troop
training and maintenance and repair) to cover such costs. The impact was especially
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pronounced when peacekeeping operations resulted in unexpected costs late in the fiscal
year. With limited funds remaining for transfer, cancellation of training and maintenance
was required to provide the necessary funding for peacekeeping operations.
In a 1994 report prepared by the GAO, five alternatives to fund the increased
costs of conducting Operations Other Than War (OOTW) were proposed [Ref. 18, p.3]:
1. Use Defense Business Operations Fund (DBOF) to fund costs
2. Authorize increased transfer and reprogramming levels for defense
appropriations
3. Establish a revolving fund
4. Establish a transfer account
5. Provide direct appropriations to each service
The Clinton administration had its own ideas for dealing with the monetary
burden of these unbudgeted operations. In 1993, President Clinton pushed for a Global
Cooperative Initiatives (GCI) account. The GCI account would serve as a repository for
funds for peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief. [Ref. 15, pA]
Congress rejected Clinton's proposal since the GCI account funds could be used at the
discretion of the administration without the approval of Congress. In 1995, the
administration made a counterproposal in the form of the Readiness Preservation
Authority (RPA). Instead of funding unbudgeted operations, RPA would allow DoD to
obligate for essential readiness in the second half of the fiscal year without an
appropriation. [Ref. 16, pA] The purpose of RPA was to alleviate fourth quarter
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shortfalls incurred by the services when unbudgeted operations took place in the last half
ofthe fiscal year and were consequently not reimbursed until the next fiscal year.
Congress ultimately rejected the RPA on the basis that it would erode the control
of the State Department and Congress on actions taken in support of peacekeeping.
Instead, the 104th Congress authorized advanced funding for ongoing peacekeeping
operations in the FY96 Appropriation Bill (Public Law 104-61). The bill contained
$647M in support of ongoing operations in Iraq (Operations Provide Comfort and
Southern Watch), to be available only after the funds were requested and the costs
detailed in the FY97 budget request. Since FY97, Congress has appropriated funds for
Southwest Asia operations (Operations Northern and Southern Watch in Iraq) within the
Overseas Contingencies Operations Transfer Fund (OCOTF). As described in the FY01
Secretary ofDefense Operations and Maintenance Overview [Ref. 9, p.75]:
The OCOTF was established to meet operational requirements in support
of contingency operations without disrupting approved program execution
or force readiness. The OCOTF is a 'no year' transfer account, and
provides additional flexibility to meet operational requirements by
transferring assets to the Military Components based on actual execution
experience as events unfold during the year of execution.
This fund was established by the Senate Appropriations Committee in the FY97
Defense Appropriations Bill as a consolidated fund site for operations and maintenance
monies for ongoing contingency operations. Despite the advanced set-asides for these
operations, annual supplemental appropriations have still been necessary. Additional
operations due to the expanded missions in the Balkans (Bosnia) have required the
4
passage of supplemental appropriations in order to cover costs incurred by the services.
However, due to the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) of 1990, these supplemental
appropriations oftentimes require rescissions in order to meet the top-line threshold for
DoD. Routinely, these rescissions are taken from modernization and procurement
accounts. Alternately, military commanders have had to forego training in the late stages
of the fiscal year in order to compensate for supplemental appropriations.
Recently, the OCOTF has ceased to fund operations in Southwest Asia.
According to Program Budget Decision (PBD) 096, dated 19 December 2000, the
"department no longer considers operations in Southwest Asia to be contingency
operations since these operations have been ongoing for ten years and there appears to be
no plan to withdraw forces in the near term." [Ref. 11, p.3] Thus, as of FY02, the
services will be required to estimate their costs for Operations Northern and Southern
Watch and annotate their budget requests appropriately. If future predictions of costs fall
below actuals, the service components will bear the additional costs.
B. INCREMENTAL COSTS
One of the difficulties in funding contingencies has been the identification and
justification of incremental costs for supporting a designated operation. The DoD
Financial Management Regulation (DoDFMR, DoD 7000.14-R) defines incremental
costs as those costs that are above and beyond baseline training, operations, and
personnel costs. In essence, incremental costs with respect to contingency operations can
be succinctly defined as those costs that would not be incurred except for participation in
the contingency. [Ref. 12, p.13] The requirement to budget for contingency operating
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costs is set forth in Chapter 17 of the DoDFMR. However, despite the four-year
existence of the OCOTF, little guidance has been given to the services regarding
acceptable methods of determining incremental costs. As a result, the services have
adopted various methodologies that have been moderately successful as justification to
OMB and Congress. Chapter 23 of Volume 12 to the DoDFMR, entitled, "Contingency
Operations," will be the first comprehensive formalized guidance to the services. It is
presently in draft form.
According to the instructions in Chapter 17 of the DoDFMR, incremental costs
are divided into four subcategories: personnel, personnel support, transportation, and
operating support. The personnel subcategory is further divided into military and civilian
personnel costs. The military personnel costs consist of not only subsistence and base
pay for reservists called into action, but also additional pay for active duty personnel such
as family separation allowances and imminent danger or hostile duty pay. Civilian costs
include wages for additional civilian temporary hires and allowances such as civilian
premium pay. The personnel support category covers additional medical support and
health services required for the contingency operation and support equipment, supplies
and clothing. The transportation category covers the costs of airlift, sealift, port handling
and other transportation costs associated with the logistics tail of the operation. Lastly,
operating support entails the training costs, Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants (POL),
supplies, Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I),
facilities support, and reconstitution costs. In FYOO, 71% of the total contingency
incremental costs requested by the DoN fell under operating support costs. [Ref. 17, p.6]
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Due to the lack of formal guidance for the services in providing estimates for
incremental costs associated with contingency operations, several different
methodologies emerged. The most glaring differences occurred in the component flying
hour programs. The Air Force designated any flying hours over their budgeted Active
Duty base flying hours as incremental. Furthermore, they counted all Reserve and
National Guard missions in support of contingencies as incremental.
The Navy computed its incremental flying hours quite differently. In fact, the
methods used by the Navy's Atlantic and Pacific Fleets not only differed substantially
from the Air Force method, but also differed from one another. The Atlantic Fleet
calculated the number of training sorties that would have occurred had the contingency
not taken place and labeled any flying hours above that "normal OPTEMPO" as
incremental. The Pacific Fleet, however, recognized training value in all flights
regardless of their mission and decided upon a median training value of 40% for all
flights for contingency operations. Therefore, the Pacific Fleet deemed that 60% of the
costs for all contingency flying hours were incremental. [Ref. 17, p.6] These disparate
methodologies were generally accepted by OMB until FYOO when they mandated that the
Navy's two Fleets decide upon a single methodology for FYOl.
C. RECONSTITUTION COSTS
The concept of incremental costs for contingency operations has been particularly
elusive and difficult to justify when addressing reconstitution costs. Categories such as
personnel costs have clearly defined incremental costs in the form of foreign duty pay
and wages for reservists called to active duty. Reconstitution, however, intertwines a
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host of variables that are not so easily disentangled. Reconstitution costs, as defined in
the DoDFMR, include the cost to clean, inspect, maintain, replace, and restore equipment
to the required condition at the conclusion of the contingency operation. Reconstitution
covers equipment organic to the participating unit and war reserve stocks prior to
replacement into storage, but excludes the cost to transport equipment being repaired
and/or restored. Typically, reconstitution occurs at the conclusion of an operation or
upon the transfer of operational control for equipment from one unit to another.
D. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY
Agency estimates of contingency operation costs have greatly improved over
time, but still require significant improvement. The host of General Accounting Office
(GAO) and Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports on the topic of contingency
funding is a testament to the level of importance Congress places upon the accuracy of
contingency cost estimating and accounting. The service components are equally
concerned, given the millions of dollars in unreimbursed expenditures made over the past
decade on contingency operations.
Unfortunately, cost estimation is merely half of the battle. Documentation and
consequently justification of incremental costs continues to present a much greater
challenge to agency budget personnel. While overall cost estimates have markedly
improved, the services continue to struggle with matters of accounting. Declining
budgets, unclear budgetary guidance, and past material misstatements have cast a shadow
upon the trustworthiness of agency requests for additional funding. The defensibility of
cost estimation and accounting methods has become as important as the costs themselves.
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The absence of clear budgetary guidance in the early periods of contingency
funding is to blame for much oftoday's continuing problems. Left to their own devices,
the services developed independent methods for detennining incremental costs. As a
result, practices differ not only between services but among them as well. The absence of
standardization breeds a lack of confidence in reliability. In order to garner
Congressional confidence in agency funding requests, a common and defendable
methodology must be used to determine and calculate incremental costs. The draft
chapter of the DoDFMR on Contingency Operation Costing will aid in defining
allowable incremental cost. However, it does not define a common methodology for
calculating incremental costs.
This study presents a defendable method for calculating incremental maintenance
and repair costs for Aircraft Launch and Recovery Equipment (ALRE) associated with
contingency operations. It is my hope that this methodology may be equally applied to
other shipboard systems, thereby creating a common, accepted methodology. Adoption
of a single methodology will simplify the accounting process for budget personnel. In
turn, a well-defined and simplified process will increase the reliability and accuracy of
accounting data. More reliable and accurate data not only provide for better estimates,
but also reduce the likelihood that Congress will reject agency funding requests.
9
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II. DATA COLLECTION
A. AIRCRAFT LAUNCH AND RECOVERY EQUIPMENT
1. Program Management
Aircraft Launch and Recovery Equipment (ALRE) blurs the division between
naval air and naval sea systems. ALRE encompasses all equipment and systems for
launch and recovery of aircraft, including catapults, arresting gear, helicopter landing
systems, visual and optical landing aids, information systems, wind measuring systems,
aviation marking and lighting installed in ships, and recovery systems and visual landing
aids installed ashore. [Ref. 1, p.3] Although nearly all ALRE components are integral to
the ship, NAVAIR exercises overall program management. The ALRE Program Office
is located at the system command's headquarters in Patuxent River, Maryland. As
described in NAVAIRINST 5400.149A, Designation of the Aircraft Launch and
Recovery Equipment Program Manager Air (PMA251j, PMA 251 is responsible for the
acquisition and logistics support of ALRE systems installed in ships, aircraft and ashore,
from research and development through test and evaluation, acquisition, and
modernization to system disposal. [Ref. 1, p.5]
The enormity of cradle to grave responsibility cannot be underestimated. The
present PMA251 Flight Integration Project Team Leader admits that his focus is divided
into three areas: acquisition, in-service changes, and recapitalization. The day-to-day
tracking of system performance and reliability is delegated to the Type Commanders
(TYCOM) and the Naval Air Systems Command, Lakehurst in New Jersey. The
TYCOM oversees ALRE training and maintenance documentation, conducts inspections
and lends assistance through maintenance management teams. Naval Air Systems
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Command, Lakehurst serves as a central source of ALRE program in-service data
analysis and ALRE technical expertise.
2. Organizational Level Maintenance
ALRE organizational level maintenance is accomplished via Planned
Maintenance System (PMS) cards under the shipboard Maintenance and Material
Management (3M) system. Similarly, ALRE organizations use the Organizational
Maintenance Management System (OMMS) to report operational maintenance
accomplishment. Although ALRE is governed by these shipboard maintenance and
repair management systems, aviation ratings within V-2 division perform maintenance on
ALRE components. As a result, the NAVAIR ALRE oversight organizations also require
ALRE organizational maintenance units to document PMS according to the Aircraft
Launch and Recovery Equipment Management Program (ALREMP). ALREMP was
designed to establish standard procedures of quality assurance and maintenance control
for ALRE. The requirements ofALREMP are outlined in OPNAVINST4700.15C.
At each TYCOM, ALREMP management teams have been established to support
the organizational units in complying with the Aircraft Launch and Recovery
Management Program. One of the primary responsibilities of these management teams is
to conduct assist visits and annual formal audits of each ship. Assist visits are informal
and advisory in nature and are normally scheduled following a ship's Selected Restricted
Availability (SRA) or during the ship's work-up cycle. Typically, the formal audits
occur just prior to or at the mid-point of the ship's deployment. [Ref. 3, p.2]
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3. IntermediatelDepot Level Maintenance
Once again, ALRE does not conform to the norm with regard to intermediate and
depot level maintenance. Normally, either Ship's Intermediate Maintenance Activities
(SIMA) or Aviation Intermediate Maintenance Departments (AIMD) would perform
intermediate level maintenance. Since each carrier is designated as an IMA, the
CV/CVN AIMD would be the first source for performance of echelon II maintenance.
However, the Maintenance Officer in charge of V-2 division aboard aircraft carriers is
given much more leeway in determining who performs intermediate and depot level
maintenance. There are very few evolutions that are required by regulation to be
performed by inorganic maintenance organizations. Therefore, many intermediate level
maintenance items are performed by ship's force. If the Maintenance Officer deems that
required intermediate maintenance is beyond the capabilities of ship's force, he requests
authorization from the TYCOM for a Naval Aviation Depot to accomplish the work.
Naval Aviation Depots (NADEP) are the primary aviation industrial
establishments for depot level maintenance. [Ref. 13, p.13-9] Within the NADEPs in
Jacksonville, Norfolk, and San Diego exist specially-trained shipyard technicians called
Voyage Repair Team (VRT) personnel. These personnel are certified by Naval Air
Systems Command, Lakehurst to conduct depot level maintenance on ALRE
components. VRTs are often tasked to make unscheduled depot level repairs in theater.
Private and government-owned shipyards are also authorized to conduct depot level
maintenance on ALRE. Once again, the allocation of work is determined by the
appropriate TYCOM.
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Thus, the TYCOM is the decision-maker for intermediate and depot-level
maintenance. Specifically, the Ship Installation Officer (N433) under
COMNAVAIRLANT and the Air Systems Officer (N435) under COMNAVAIRPAC act
as the TYCOM representatives. These individuals screen, coordinate and direct all work
and funding for ALRE to include coordination with the surface community in support of
ALREMP.
4. Reportingffrend Analysis
As discussed above, organizational maintenance on ALRE is reported via the
Organizational Maintenance Management System (OMMS). ALREMP, however,
requires additional data collection and reporting. The main recipient of this additional
data is Naval Air Systems Command, Lakehurst. Monthly, each ship submits launch and
recovery data via the Automated Shot and Recovery Log (ASRL) system to Naval Air
Systems Command, Lakehurst. On a quarterly basis, commands must submit a Flight
Deck Operations Report to Naval Air Systems Command, Lakehurst. Naval Air Systems
Command, Lakehurst compiles the data and computes parameters such as mean shots to
failure for various ALRE components.
B. SOURCES OF INFORMATION
1. Technical/Operational Sources
As described above, the TYCOMs play a central role in the technical and
operational decisions regarding ALRE. The COMNAVAIRLANT and
COMNAVAIRPAC Ship Installation Officers (N433 and N435) control the scheduling of
the ALRE management teams and the voyage repair teams. These TYCOM
representatives also screen the ships' Current Ship's Maintenance Projects (CSMP) and
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program echelon II and III maintenance accomplishment among the various intermediate
and depot level maintenance facilities.
Naval Air Systems Command, Lakehurst is another valuable source of technical
information. As the cognizant field activity for ALRE, Naval Air Systems Command,
Lakehurst is responsible for research and development, test and evaluation, and in-service
engineering of ALRE. As part of their in-service engineering duties, Naval Air Systems
Command, Lakehurst provides technical and logistics support to the fleet activities. The
Carrier and Field Service Unit (CAFSU) of Naval Air Systems Command, Lakehurst
sponsors a team of highly skilled civilian technicians located at various CONUS field
offices (and one in Yokosuka, Japan) to assist operational units in repairing and testing
ALRE. Although a branch of Naval Air Systems Command, Lakehurst, CAFSU is under
the operational control of CAFSU Supervisors located at each TYCOM.
The operational units themselves are important data points as well. Often times,
the underlying reasons for trends cannot be derived from aggregate reports collected at
the Immediate Superior In the Chain of Command (ISIC) level. Maintenance Chiefs and
Catapult Officers can provide important insight by grounding the statistics in a "deck
plate" level assessment. Any analysis without their input would be incomplete.
2. Budgetary Sources
The topic of contingency costing has been addressed at high levels in the
executive and legislative branches of the federal government. In the executive branch,
the Office of Management and Budget and the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense
(Comptroller) have promulgated various memoranda to service component budget
personnel outlining the format for submission of contingency budget requests and actual
costs. In the DoN, these submissions are channeled through the Navy's Office ofBudget
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(FMB) for consolidation and review. These documents are important benchmarks for
establishing successful criteria for justification of reconstitution cost requests. In the
legislative branch, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) and General Accounting
Office (GAO) have conducted various studies on contingency costing and accounting at
the behest of Congressional members over the past decade. These studies will
supplement the OMB guidance and past Program Budget Decisions (PBD) regarding the
level ofjustification required for reconstitution budget requests.
Maintenance cost data are the focal point of this research. Reconstitution costs
due to contingency operations are most notably manifested in an increase in maintenance
costs following an extended operation away from industrial facilities with the capability
to perfonn echelon II and III maintenance actions. Intennediate and depot level
availability cost trends are therefore valuable data points for determining the effects of
contingency operations on the reconstitution effort.
C. DATA COLLECTION METHODS
1. Review of Regulations and Reports
Literary reviews are an essential starting point to gain an appreciation for the
complexity of contingency operation budget estimation and cost accounting. The
evolving budgetary guidance of the DoD Financial Management Regulation (DoDFMR)
provides a picture of how the agencies are grappling with the difficulties of incremental
cost separation and cost accounting in complex contingency operations. Programming
Budget Decisions provide great insight into the Department of Defense's self-assessment
in budgeting and justifying incremental contingency costs. Previous research reports and
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fonner studies by the GAO and CRS serve as external assessment of the level of agency
success in accurately capturing contingency costs. The General Accounting Office has
been especially prolific in researching past budget submissions and actual costing of
contingency operations.
In the operational spectrum, maintenance and training policy instructions are
essential for the derivation of offsets and explanation of costs in excess of the nonn due
to operational requirements or deficiencies. Inspection reports from various groups such
as the Inspector General's office and the TYCOM maintenance management teams can
confinn operational difficulties or illuminate training issues. Similarly, operational unit
training records may be utilized to confinn or deny training issues affecting maintenance
and repair costs.
2. Databases
As a part of ALREMP, ALRE data are forwarded to Naval Air Systems
Command, Lakehurst and the appropriate TYCOM. Both organizations serve as central
repositories for the storage and analysis of historical data on ALRE. The databases
maintained by the TYCOMs and Naval Air Systems Command, Lakehurst are used to
compare actual component failure rates with design perfonnance criteria in order to
identify any significant trends.
The various maintenance databases are a wealth of infonnation regarding the
execution of required preventive and corrective maintenance on ALRE. The core
database at the organizational level is the Current Ship's Maintenance Project (CSMP).
Defennent of all organizational level maintenance is documented in the ship's CSMP.
As a scheduled maintenance period approaches, the TYCOM screens the CSMP job list
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in preparation for the availability Work Definition Conference (WDC). At the WDC, the
CSMP is divided into a Ship's Force Work Package (SFWP) and Availability Work
Package (AWP). As the names suggest, the SFWP is to be completed by ship's crew
during the availability while the AWP is assigned to the industrial facility. Upon a ship's
completion of an availability, a Completed Work Package is issued by the industrial
facility. These databases furnish a means of determining if operational maintenance is
being deferred more often during contingency operations.
3. Interviews
Personal interviews are an extremely important source of information for any
research. The insight provided by those most intimately involved in an organization's
operations is essential. All aspects of this research are supported by interviews with
individuals whose day-to-day duties reflect a particular area of interest to this research.
At the deck plates, maintenance chiefs, quality control personnel, catapult officers and
maintenance officers have been contacted regarding the operation of a V-2 division
aboard an aircraft carrier. Program managers at both Type Commands and the Program
Office for ALRE (PMA 251) at NAVAIR Headquarters were consulted in the data
collection process. Lastly, interviews with budgetary personnel in both the executive and
legislative branches to include FMB, GAO, and NAVAIR were conducted. Their
personal experiences were essential to wade through the litany of requirements set forth
in various regulations and instructions regarding budgeting, programming, and
accounting for contingency costs and ship maintenance costs.
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III. DATA REDUCTION
A. VARIABLES AFFECTING MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR COSTS
1. Design
The Naval Air Systems Command, Lakehurst is the lead technical organization
for ALRE. The command is divided into various departments covering the full life cycle
of ALRE components. The product development department of the Naval Air Systems
Command, Lakehurst helps to derive the initial cost estimates for periodic maintenance
of ALRE. Errors in initial estimates of maintenance and repair costs made during the
design phase could manufacture an artificial increase in upkeep costs following product
introduction. However, most ALRE systems have been in place for more than two
decades. As a result, any life cycle cost inaccuracies during the product development
stage have been superseded by the time of this data collection.
Over the life cycle of ALRE, the in-service engineering department of Naval Air
Systems, Lakehurst promulgates changes in maintenance procedures and material
composition of ALRE components through a multitude of technical directives and ship
alterations. Most of these in-service changes are the result of new technologies or
processes that have been approved for implementation following extensive cost/benefit
analyses. The installation and implementation costs for these changes are tracked under
the Service Change Installation Program (SCIP). The costs (particularly ship alterations)
can be significant, but were not included in this analysis since such modernizations are
unrelated to operational commitments. The funding for SCIP installations is through
PMA 251 rather than the operational chain, and is therefore easily separated. [Ref. 19]
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However, the maintenance and repair cost savings due to improved component
performance and reduced maintenance requirements do have an impact on the data of this
analysis. Since not all ships are fitted with equipment changes simultaneously, cost
savings resulting from service changes commence at varying times. However, most
service changes are implemented on all platforms within the course of a year.
Furthermore, the savings afforded by SCIP installations are insignificant in comparison to
the total maintenance and repair costs for any single platform over the course of a fiscal
year. Since all data analysis spans at least a fiscal year, the effects of SCIP savings from
platform to platform are small.
2. Operations
Q. System Age
Although intermediate and depot level maintenance are comprehensive,
system age still has some bearing on ALRE maintenance and repair costs. Most major
overhauls of ALRE incorporate reconditioned parts into the repairs. The Naval Aviation
Depots (NADEP) and Voyage Repair Teams (VRT) maintain a rolling stock of major
components to minimize the time necessary to accomplish major overhauls of ALRE
components. Thus, no ALRE systems or even subsystems are fully outfitted with new
components during depot level availabilities. Although the reconditioned equipment
meets stringent specifications for reinstallation, its service life is unarguably less than that
of a new component.
Perhaps of higher importance, ship age can result in higher maintenance
and repair costs. Despite the best attempts to preserve ships' spaces, older ships tend to
have more preservation problems throughout their spaces. When equipment operates in
an increasingly adverse environment, failure rates and performance problems occur with
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higher frequency. The higher incidence of corrective repairs on older ships translates into
increased maintenance and repair costs.
h. Level ofUsage
The level of usage is an obvious factor in the level of maintenance and
repair required of ALRE. In fact, many of the organizational maintenance items are
driven not by time, but by the number of catapult shots or recoveries. Even some of the
periodic maintenance is derived from an assumed level of usage. Moreover, nearly all of
the major maintenance items (echelon II and III) are scheduled according to level of
usage based on historical failure rates. Since these more complex maintenance
evolutions constitute a large fraction of the overall maintenance cost of ALRE
components, usage and thus OPTEMPO are significant factors to consider in analyzing
maintenance and repair costs.
c. Preventive Maintenance Practices
Proper preventive maintenance accomplishment is another significant
factor for ALRE maintenance and repair costs. Improper preventive maintenance
practices ultimately lead to premature component degradation and early overhaul or
replacement of neglected components. One of the major tenets of the Maintenance and
Material Management System (3M) and the Aircraft Launch and Recovery Equipment
Management Program (ALREMP) is preventive maintenance supervision. Whether
conducted organically by Collateral Duty Inspectors (CDI) and Quality Assurance (QA)
personnel, or externally through inspection by Mobile Training Teams and the ALREMP
Management Team, PMS oversight is central to minimizing equipment downtime and life
cycle costs.
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d. Unit Material andLabor Costs
Unit material and labor costs have a direct imp~ ton ALRE maintenance
and repair costs. Inflation pervades most industries. ALRE is no exception. Unit
material and labor costs continue to rise at varying rates from year to year. The rise in
unit material and labor costs is offset somewhat by initiatives through in-service changes
designed to lower maintenance and repair costs. However, the gains made by SCIP pale
in comparison to the overwhelming force ofthe ever-increasing "cost ofdoing business."
B. VARIABLE SEPARATION
1. Training Usage
Carrier Qualification (CQ) operations represent the formal training usage of
ALRE. Pilots of carrier-borne aircraft must perform numerous carrier launches and
landings in order to complete both initial qualification and refresher training. These CQ
operations are normally scheduled during Tailored Ship's Training Availability (TSTA)
IV or Independent Steaming Exercises (ISE). [Ref. 2, p.2] These operations represent a
considerable spike in usage ofALRE.
The data from CQ operations are important for two distinct reasons. The primary
use of the data is to develop an offset for training. When a carrier is engaged in extended
overseas contingency operations, the carrier is not subject to supporting the Chief of
Naval Air Training (CNATRA) for initial pilot qualification. Similarly, carriers in
theater are not called upon to support proficiency training for Fleet Replacement
Squadrons (FRS). Thus, training flight launches and recoveries are at a minimum when
engaged in contingency operations.
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Regardless of contingency operations, the requirement to conduct CQ operations
in order to either qualify or maintain the proficiency of State-side pilots exists. Therein
lies the second importance to the CQ operations data. The burden not borne by the
carrier involved in a contingency must be assumed by a carrier in homeport. Therefore,
increased ALRE usage by homeport carriers may hasten the requirement for a
maintenance availability. The CQ operations data illuminate any imbalance in the
burden-sharing of carriers with regard to carrier qualifications training.
2. Normal OPTEMPO Usage
"Normal" OPTEMPO is a difficult parameter to derive, particularly in view of the
expanding responsibilities of the U.S. military since the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
The Cold War made for a relatively steady workload for the Armed Forces. For the past
ten years, the number of missions assumed by U.S. forces has been anything but steady.
Moreover, the force structure of the U.S. Armed Forces has changed dramatically since
1989. In a decade, the U.S. Navy has gone from a vision of six hundred ships to nearly
half that number. "Doing more with less" has been the mantra for the better part of a
decade.
The active aircraft carrier force dropped from 15 in 1990 to 12 in 2001 as the
Forrestal class aircraft carriers were retired. Nevertheless, the number of carriers has not
fluctuated much over the period of this study. In 1995, the number of active carriers
dropped from 12 to 11, only to return to 12 once again in 2000. This small dip in carrier
strength was actually administrative, not operational. The USS Kennedy (CV 67) was
placed into the ranks of the reserves upon completion of its overhaul in 1995, but
maintained an active OPTEMPO and was eventually restored to active duty. Agency
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Unit Material and Labor Costs
budget submissions and force planning documents provide an assumed "normal"
OPTEMPO for the carrier fleet based upon underway days per quarter. Presently, the
budget provides funds to achieve an OPTEMPO goal of 50.5 underway days per quarter
for deployed forces and 28 underway days per quarter for non-deployed forces. [Ref. 4,
p.2-3]
ALRE operations are not only affected by the ship's schedule but also the
requirements of the aircraft and aircrew. The number of active Navy carrier air wings has
sharply declined from a Cold War strength of fifteen. Over the past five years, the
number of Navy carrier air wings has steadied at ten, but the number of tactical aircraft
and pilots has continued to decrease steadily. From FY1995 to FY1997, the active
aircraft inventory dropped 3.7%. [Ref. 8, p.5] Aircraft force structure adjustments
following the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 1997 further decreased the number
of active aircraft by 2.8% between FY98 and FYOO. [Ref. 6, p.2-9]
Aircraft OPTEMPO is governed by the Navy's Flying Hour Program. The Flying
Hour Program is funded to cover the cost to train and maintain qualified aircrews in the
primary mission of their aircraft. Recent increases in maintenance costs attributed to
aging aircraft and increasing repair parts prices have pushed the Department of the
Navy's goal for tactical air Primary Mission Readiness (PMR) from 83% to 81 %. [Ref 4,
p.2-10]
3.
Inflation indices for use in DoN budget formulation are promulgated by the Office
of Budget (FMB). These indices have been used to adjust for increases in labor costs
between fiscal years for ALRE intermediate and depot level maintenance. However, the
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FMB indices for material costs were not used in the analysis because they were too
generic. Both TYCOMs and Naval Air Systems Command, Lakehurst retain historical
data on ALRE costs. These historical data are subdivided into material costs and labor
costs. A specific material inflation index for ALRE was derived by comparing the price
for identical ALRE components from year to year. A former Catapult and Arresting Gear
Maintenance Officer at COMNAVAIRPAC, LT Gil Mucke, developed the material
inflation index used in this study (see Appendix H). LT Mucke tracked ALRE cost data
from FY95 to FYOO on organizational level maintenance material. Application of these
two inflation indices served to estimate the increase in the "cost of doing business" due
solely to inflation in maintenance and repair parts and labor.
C. GOAL OF VARIABLE SEPARATION
The goal of defining and separating the variables impacting ALRE maintenance
and repair costs is to isolate operational tempo. Contingency operations represent an
unexpected and therefore unbudgeted increase in operational requirements. Without an
established baseline of costs, arguments for incremental funding for contingency
operations are a matter of interpretation. Establishing a universally accepted baseline of
costs in terms of a small base of variables will aid in justifying supplemental funding
requests for future contingency operations. Quantification of that baseline is the task at
hand.
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Regression analysis is a common means of determining the statistical relevance of
one variable upon the behavior of a second variable. In financial analysis, this second
variable, termed the dependent variable, is oftentimes cost or price. The first, or
independent variable, is the subject of the analysis. In regression analysis, the
independent variable(s) is mathematically tested as a predictor for the value of the
dependent variable. Therefore, independent variables are commonly called explanatory
variables. Simply put, fmancial regression analysis is a way to predict cost in terms of
non-cost factors.
Regression analysis conducted with more than a single explanatory variable is
termed multiple regression analysis. Using more than one explanatory variable typically
allows for a more accurate estimation of cost. In multiple regression analysis, each
independent variable is assigned responsibility for a portion of the variation in cost.
Although this distribution of cost behavior among the explanatory variables allows for
greater accuracy, inclusion of multiple variables in the analysis also introduces a greater
possibility for violating the mathematical assumptions underlying the theory of regression
analysis. Several tests have been developed to detect such violations and have been
incorporated into the analysis.
This thesis employs regression analysis to determine a model to explain ALRE
maintenance and repair costs in terms of non-cost factors. Chapter III described several
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variables that would reasonably impact ALRE maintenance and repair costs. These
variables are considered the independent variables and ALRE maintenance and repair
cost is the dependent variable in this analysis.
B. BASELINE DETERMINATION
1. "Normal" OPTEMPO
The DoD Financial Management Regulation (DoDFMR, DoD 7000.l4-R) defines
incremental costs as those costs that are above and beyond baseline training, operations,
and personnel costs. [Ref. 20, p.23-6] Baseline operations with respect to ALRE may be
approached in a couple of different ways. As previously discussed, ALRE does not
reside wholly within either NAVAIR or NAVSEA. The majority of funding for technical
support and echelon II and III maintenance is provided through NAVAIR, yet major
overhauls are funded through the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) account.
The V-2 Division Maintenance Officer must project the division's OPTAR (Operational
Target) funding in order to comply with both NAVSEA's shipboard 3M system and
NAVAIR's ALREMP. Thus, any baseline of operations derived solely from either wing
or ship operations may fail to fully represent the "nonnal" OPTEMPO ofV-2 division.
Since ALRE essentially serves two masters, the problem ofestablishing a baseline
of operations was approached from both NAVAIR and NAVSEA perspectives. The
Naval Air community utilizes the Flying Hour Program (FHP) and its accompanying
metric, Primary Mission Readiness (PMR) percentage to track and justify funding for its
flight operations. The U.S. Navy tactical air PMR goal for FYOI and FY02 is 81 %
(includes 2% simulator contribution). [Ref. 4, p.2-10] As recently as two years ago, the
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tactical PMR goal was as high as 85% (includes 2% simulator contribution). [Ref. 6, p.2-
11] However, recent increases in depot level repairable costs have driven up the cost per
flying hour. Actual depot level repairable costs have been higher than budgeted every
year since 1993 with the exception of 1995. Depot level repairable cost underestimations
ranged from ten to twenty-eight per cent over this period. [Ref. 10, p.3] As a result, the
number of flying hours (and consequently PMR) decreased in order to remain within
budget.
The Naval Sea Systems community funds ship operations based upon underway
days. For the last four years, the Navy's goal has stood at 50.5 underway days per
quarter for deployed forces and 28 underway days per quarter for non-deployed forces.
In FY97, the OPTEMPO provided under the budget was only slightly different at 50.5
underway days for deployed units and 27 underway days for non-deployed units. Over
the past five years, deployed units have exceeded their OPTEMPO goal, while non-
deployed units have fallen slightly short of the quarterly goal [Ref. 7, p.2-2]
Regression analysis was performed on the number of catapult shots with both
PMR and underway days as explanatory variables, individually. The regression analysis
showed mixed results - hardly surprising considering ALRE's unique blend of Naval Air
and Sea operational ties. The regression with underway days was done using CY97
,
through CYOO data derived from the operational schedules of the carriers homeported on
the east coast (see Appendix B). West coast carriers were not included because the
AIRPAC operational data were not detailed enough to provide an accurate count of
underway days. Regression showed a strong relationship between underway days and
catapult shots for non-deployed units (see Figure 4.1), but a rather weak relationship for
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Non- Deployed Underway Days vs.
Catapult Shots (FY97-00)
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Non-Deployed Underway Days vs. Catapult Shots
deployed units (see Figure 4.2). Deployed underway days spent in transit (between
C01\TUS and deployment area, Suez Canal, numerous ports of call) may explain the weak
relationship for deployed units.
Regression using PMR was performed based upon monthly PMR percentages for
Carrier Air Wings TWO, FIVE, NINE, ELEVEN, and FOURTEEN. The data provided
by COMNAVA1RPAC spanned operations from FY97 to FYOO (see Appendix C). The
results of the regression were a complete reversal from the undenvay day analysis. There
was a strong tie between the number of catapult shots and PMR for deployed units (see
Figure 4.3), yet no noteworthy relationship for non-deployed units (see Figure 4.4). The
lack ofa relationship between PMR and the number ofcatapult shots for non-deployed
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Figure 4.2 Deployed Underway Days vs. Catapult Shots
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Figure 4.3 Deployed Carrier Wing PMR vs. Catapult Shots
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units is not truly surprising given that the portion of PMR required to be perfonned
aboard an aircraft carrier is relatively smalL
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Figure 4.4 Non-Deployed Carrier Wing PMR vs. Catapult Shots
2. Training
ALRE supports the proficiency training of the Carrier Air Wings and the training
of Fleet Replacement Squadrons (FRS). Separation of the two sets of requirements is
often quite difficult. Ideally, the number of launches in support of the FRS should have
been tabulated from Air Operations Summary Message Reports. According to
COMNAVAIRPAC Instruction 3740.2W entitled, "Carrier Qualification (CQ)
Operations," an Air Operations Summary Message Report must be sent to the appropriate
TYCOM follo\\ing each FRS CQ period. The report enumerates the number of pilots
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qualified and the number of arrestments conducted during the CQ period. [Ref 2,
enclosure 5] Unfortunately, the TYCOMs do not maintain historical files of these
reports. Therefore, historical data on carrier operations provided by the TYCOMs and
the Automated Shot and Recovery Logs (ASRL) from Naval Air Systems Command,
Lakehurst (Appendices D and E) were compared in order to estimate the number of
launches made in support of training FRS. The AIRLANT data are less accurate than the
AIRPAC data because AIRLANT routinely conducts carrier qualifications for its organic
components concurrently with FRS carrier qualifications. AIRPAC does not typically
mix the two training evolutions.
The training baseline for the operational units is embedded in the Navy's Flying
Hour Program. The tactical PMR goal of 81 % for FYO1 and FY02 represents the level of
funding allotted the carrier air wings to maintain pilot proficiency and train and equip the
aircrews. Although the carrier qualification proficiency requirements for qualified pilots
are less intensive than the initial carrier qualification requirements for FRS pilots, carrier
air wing training requirements consume a major portion of the catapult shots for non-
deployed units. However, as previously discussed, PMR does not accurately predict
ALRE usage for non-deployed units. Since the bulk of carrier air wing training takes
place in conjunction with fleet and carrier group exercises and PMR is not an effective
metric for non-deployed units, the training baseline was subsumed within the operational
tempo metrics.
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C. DETERMINATION OF OPTEMPO INCREMENT
1. Baseline Computation Example
The operations and training baseline is computed using the two equations
illustrated in Figures 4.1 and 4.3. The current non-deployed operational tempo is 9.3
underway days per month (28 days per quarter). For non-deployed units per the
regression ofFigure 4.1:
# Catapult Shots/month = -10 + 79.55 Underway Days/month
Substituting 9.3 underway days per month into the equation yields 730 catapult shots per
non-deployed unit month. Over the past three fiscal years, the Navy carrier fleet has
averaged 74 non-deployed months per fiscal year. Multiplying 74 months and 730
catapult shots per month results in a fiscal year total of 54,020 non-deployed catapult
shots.
Presently, average deployed PMR is estimated at 105% (see Appendix C). This
figure includes sorties flown in support of contingencies. Contingency sorties accounted
for 5% and 3% of the total tactical PMR achieved in FY 99 and FYOO, respectively. [Ref.
11, p.7] Thus, the average baseline deployed PMR is approximately 101%. For
deployed units per the regression ofFigure 4.3:
# Catapult Shots/month = 238 + 13.18 PMR
Substituting 101% into the equation yields 1569 catapult shots per deployed unit month.
Over the past three fiscal years, the Navy carrier fleet has averaged 31 months on
deployment. Multiplying 31 months and 1569 catapult shots per month results in a fiscal
year total of 48,639 deployed catapult shots. Summing deployed and non-deployed
catapult shots results in a baseline of 102,659 catapult shots per fiscal year. In FYOO, the
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carrier fleet executed 98,366 total catapult shots. During that year, the number of carrier
fleet non-deployed and deployed months was lower than average at 72 and 28 months,
respectively.
2. Incremental Calculation
Using the goals established for the fiscal year in question, the baseline for ALRE
training and operations may be calculated as above. Once this baseline has been set, any
contingencies that exceed the baseline could justifiably be classified as incremental. In
the case of FYOO, the calculated baseline would have been 96,866 catapult shots. Since
98,366 catapult shots were executed in FYOO, the increment for the fiscal year would
have been 1500 catapult shots. During FYOO, the carrier air wings aboard the USS John
F. Kennedy, USS Dwight D. Eisenhower, USS George Washington, USS Constellation,
and USS John C. Stennis flew well in excess of 1500 missions in support of Operations
Northern and Southern Watch in the Arabian Gulf. Therefore, the 1500 catapult shots
should be categorized as incremental due to contingency operations.
However, in Program Budget Decision 096 of December 2000, the Navy was
denied funding for contingency flying hours in FYOO because the Flying Hour Program
was underexecuted. The contingency sorties were applied to the Flying Hour Program
shortfall and therefore were not considered incremental. [Ref. 11, p.7] Based upon this
PBD finding, the baseline would be recalculated as follows: Recalculating catapult shots
using the equation from Figure 4.3 and the full PMR of 105% yields a revised figure of
1622 catapult shots per deployed unit month. Multiplying 28 months and 1622 catapult
shots per month results in a fiscal year total of 45,416 deployed catapult shots.
Multiplying 72 non-deployed months and 730 catapult shots per month (per regression of
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Figure 4.1) results in a fiscal year total of 52,560 non-deployed catapult shots. Summing
deployed and non-deployed catapult shots results in a revised baseline of 97,976 catapult
shots for FYOO. The revised increment then decreases from 1500 to 390 catapult shots.
Thus, even though the Navy was denied incremental funding for its Flying Hour Program
due to contingencies, the equipment still bore a burden above its established baseline.
D. INCREMENT COSTING
Having established incremental usage of ALRE, an associated incremental cost
may be determined. As outlined in Chapter 2, ALRE maintenance and repair costs are
divided into organizational level and intermediate/depot level maintenance. The V-2
division personnel accomplish all of the organizational level maintenance. Therefore,
only the material costs for organizational maintenance will be addressed. Intermediate
and depot level maintenance is performed by the various Naval Aviation Depots
(NADEPs), commercial contractors, commercial and navy shipyards, and Voyage Repair
Teams (VRTs) with technical assistance from the Carrier and Field Service Units
(CAFSUs) of Naval Air Systems Command, Lakehurst. Both material and labor costs
are therefore pertinent to an analysis ofALRE intermediate/depot level maintenance.
1. Operational Level Material Costs
During the USS Constellation's 1998 Arabian Gulf deployment, a running tally
was kept of all the material used in the accomplishment of maintenance and repair of
ALRE. The data were tabulated by LT Gil Mucke of COMNAVAIRPAC and although
the data compiled are too voluminous to list, a summary is presented in Appendix F. The
resultant cost for organizational maintenance and repair was $144 per catapult shot
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($FYOO). A study conducted by Naval Air Systems Command, Lakehurst, entitled
"ALRE Cost of Ownership" (see Appendix G) was used as a check on this one-time
figure. Based on FY99 costing data, the Naval Air Systems Command, Lakehurst study
enumerated all costs associated with research and development, procurement, and
operating and support costs for ALRE. The operational level dollar figures were based
upon V-2 Division OPTAR expenditures and returned a cost of $137 per catapult shot
($FY99).
2. IntermediatelDepot Level Material and Labor Costs
Intermediate and depot level cost data are spread among several different
commands. The Ship Installation Offices at each TYCOM maintain program funds for
upkeep and emergent repair of ALRE. These funds are set aside to support non-Chief of
Naval Operations (CNO) availabilities such as Restricted Availabilities (RAVs) and
inport upkeep periods. TYCOM funds for CNO availabilities such as Selected Restricted
Availabilities (SRAs) and Planned Incremental Availabilities (PIAs) are tracked
separately by the TYCOM budget department. Much of the work for CND availabilities
is performed by the shipyards in Norfolk, VA, Bremerton, WA and Yokosuka, Japan.
Thus, Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair (SupShip) Code 1800 tracks
many of the costs for the shipyard work. Lastly, the Navy Center for Cost Analyses also
captures ALRE intermediate and depot level repair costs for their Visibility and
Management of Maintenance and Operating Costs (VAMOSC) database. However, none
of these commands tracks all aspects of ALRE intermediate and depot level maintenance
and repair costs.
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From an overall cost standpoint, the TYCOMs are the most comprehensive source
of information. Between the Ship Installation Office and the budget department, all
ALRE costs are accounted for at an aggregate level. Table 4.1 lists upkeep and
availability costs provided by each TYCOM for Fiscal Years (FY) 1997 through 2000.
The costs listed in Table 4.1 are unadjusted for inflation. Inflation adjustments to the
TYCOM data are reflected in Table 4.2. Adjustments were made using the material cost
index of Appendix H and the price escalation indices listed in FMB's FY99 budget
submission. Based upon ALRE historical data (FY97-00) provided by the Navy Center
for Cost Analyses (see Appendices I and J), the assumed division between material and
labor of 42/58 was made in applying the inflation indices. Using the cost data of Table
4.2, the average cost for echelon II and III maintenance and repair is $262 per catapult
shot.
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AIRLANT ($000) ($000) ($000) ($000)
Upkeep 2972 2190 4410 3408
Availabilities 5158 8914 8028 11305
TOTAL 8130 11104 12438 14713
AIRPAC
Upkeep 5919 6849 7209 7215
Availabilities 0 2196 3242 4519
TOTAL 5919 9045 10451 11734
TOTALS
Upkeep Tot 8891 9039 11619 10623
Avail Tot 5158 11110 11270 15824
Grand Total 14049 20149 22889 26447
Table 4.1 TYCOM Upkeep and Availability Cost Data (Then Year Dollars)
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I FY97 FY98 FY99 FYOO
AIRLANT ($000) ($000) ($000) ($000)
Upkeep 3876 2603 4795 3408
Availabilities 6727 10596 8728 11305
TOTAL 10602 13199 13523 14713
AIRPAC
Upkeep 7719 8141 7838 7215
Availabilities 0 2610 3525 4519
TOTAL 7719 10752 11363 11734
TOTALS
Upkeep Tot 11595 10744 12632 10623
Avail Tot 6727 13206 12253 15824
Grand Total 18322 23951 24885 26447
Table 4.2 TYCOM Upkeep and Availability Cost Data (FYOO Dollars)
To assign the full cost of intennediate and depot level maintenance and repairs on
the basis of catapult shots ignores the factor of system age. In order to assess whether
ship age is a significant factor in maintenance and repair costs, multiple regression was
perfonned on the cost of upkeep and availabilities using the number of catapult shots and
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ship age as explanatory variables. The multiple regression model showed that the ship
age had a negligible effect upon the costs to maintain ALRE. In fact, the regression
model excluding ship age was statistically superior to the model including ship age.
The full cost of intennediate maintenance and repair cannot be reasonably
assessed solely on the basis of catapult shots. There are depot-level maintenance items
such as work on the catapult trough covers and the catapult steam system that are driven
more by time than usage level. Upkeep and emergent repairs are reasonably attributed
wholly to catapult shots since the work is closely tied to recent operations. Upkeep
represents 45% of the total echelon II and III maintenance and repair costs (see Table
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4.2). Therefore, $118 of the $262 may be reasonably assigned on the basis of catapult
shots.
In order to account for availability work not tied to catapult and arresting gear
usage, a listing of ALRE work done by availability was obtained from SupShip Code
1800 in Newport, News, VA. The SupShip cost report listed all availability work items
by Extended Ship Work Breakdown Structure (ESWBS) code. AIIHne items for codes
pertaining to jet blast deflectors, aircraft elevators and elevator doors, aircraftlhelicopter
handling and support facilities and the catapult steam system were deleted from
consideration. The resultant aggregate costs are shown in Table 4.3. Based on this
modified costing model, the availability cost for ALRE is $60 per catapult shot. 'When
combined with the upkeep costs, the modified average echelon II and III maintenance and
repair figure is $178 per catapult shot.
AIRLANT ($000) ($000) ($000) ($000)
Upkeep 3876 2603 4795 3408
Availabilities 786 3358 3315 6470
TOTAL 4662 5961 8110 9878
AIRPAC
Upkeep 7719 8141 7838 7215
Availabilities 0 966 1304 1672
TOTAL 7719 9107 9142 8887
TOTALS
Upkeep Tot 11595 10744 12632 10623
Avail Tot 786 4324 4619 8142
Grand Total 12381 15068 17252 18765




Reconstitution of ALRE would be estimated in the following fashion for a
contingency with a predicted 3000 sorties assuming the baseline operational tempo and
training levels were met for the fiscal year:
Operational Level Material:
3000 shots X $144 = $ 432,000
Intermediateillepot Maintenance and Repair -Upkeep:
3000 shots X $118 = $ 354,000
Intermediateillepot Maintenance and Repair -Availabilities:
3000 shots X $ 60 = $ 180,000
Total Reconstitution Cost: $ 966,000
The Total Reconstitution Cost figure represents the additional burden borne by
ALRE as a direct result of the contingency operation. The operational level material and
upkeep portions of the total cost are near term costs that the service would expend within
a year of the actual operation. The availability portion of the total cost (19%) would not
become a burden until the next scheduled availability (up to two years later). In Chapter
V, the implications of the incremental costs calculated above are summarized and
discussed.
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v. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
Contingency operations have become common evolutions for the U.S. military
over the past decade. Since the conclusion of the Cold War, the United States Armed
Forces have participated in over one hundred Operations Other Than War (OOTW),
ranging from humanitarian assistance and disaster recovery operations to peacekeeping
and peace enforcement. [Ref. 14, pp.91-100] Most of these engagements occurred in
response to a crisis and therefore were not included in the defense agencies' budgets. In
order to cover contingency costs, DoD activities routinely transferred or reprogrammed
funds from within their existing budgets. The service components were subsequently
reimbursed through supplemental appropriations, but frequently readiness was affected
while awaiting reimbursement. The establishment of the Overseas Contingency
Operations Transfer Fund (OCOTF) has mitigated the fiscal impact of contingency
operations on the services, but supplemental appropriations· have still been necessary to
reimburse the services for contingency-related expenditures.
Contingency reconstitution costs, the costs to maintain, replace, and restore
equipment to a fully operational condition at the conclusion of a contingency, have not
been fully captured by the services in their requests for reimbursement. The Navy has
recovered some reconstitution costs in the maintenance and repair of aircraft and ground
combat equipment, but has not actively sought reimbursement for its fleet of ships. This
thesis forges the extension of reconstitution cost recovery to shipboard systems.
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B. CONCLUSIONS
This thesis presents a defendable method for calculating incremental maintenance
and repair costs for Aircraft Launch and Recovery Equipment (ALRE) associated with
contingency operations. The DoD Financial Management Regulation clearly stipulates
that costs must exceed a baseline of operations and training in order to be considered
incremental. This thesis establishes a baseline of operations and training using regression
analysis.
The explanatory variables used in the regression analysis are the universally
accepted metrics of underway steaming days and Primary Mission Readiness (PMR).
The dependent variable in the analysis is the number of catapult shots. The number of
catapult shots was selected due to its direct link with maintenance and repair costs. The
grand majority of maintenance and repair performed on ALRE is based upon the number
of catapult shots or arrestments made using the equipment. Historical data on
maintenance and repair costs were then applied to the number of catapult shots recorded
between FY97 and FYOO. The result is a maintenance and repair cost breakdown per
catapult shot in organizational level material, and intermediate and depot level material
and labor.
In total, each catapult shot costs approximately $322 ($FYOO) in maintenance and
repair to ALRE. Using this cost figure, the Navy may predict future costs of ALRE
based on an assumed tempo of operations and training. More importantly, the Navy may
use the figures in this thesis to justify requests for reimbursement ofALRE reconstitution
costs due to contingency operations.
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Application to Other Shipboard Systems
It is the hope of this author that this thesis may serve as a model for similar
studies of other shipboard systems. Although the dependent variable of catapult shots is
ALRE-specific, the process of establishing a baseline through underway days and PMR is
not. Application of another dependent variable, such as Effective Full Power Hours
(EFPH) in the case of nuclear fuel expenses, may result in similar findings for the
recovery of contingency reconstitution costs for the engineering department of a nuclear-
propelled carrier.
2. Incremental Cost Justification
OMB and OSD contend that contingency flight hours should be applied to PMR
shortfalls instead of being categorized as incremental. The Navy contends that
contingency flying hours cannot be substituted for budgeted FHP hours because they are
not equivalent. The Navy's stance is supported by this thesis. As demonstrated in the
calculations and discussion under the heading, "Incremental Calculation" in Chapter IV
(pp. 35-36), ALRE still bore a burden above its established baseline even if the sorties
were not considered to be incremental. It is therefore likely that the Navy's contention
that contingency flying hours and budgeted FHP hours are not interchangeable is well-
founded. From the standpoint of the V-2 Division personnel, non-deployed PMR and
deployed PMR are not equivalent, as the aircraft carrier's PMR burden while deployed is
much higher. Further research into the relationship of PMR and aircraft carrier
operations may lead to a quantifiable answer to this debate.
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APPENDIX A. LIST OF ACRONYMS
Maintenance and Material Management System
Aviation Intermediate Maintenance Department
Aircraft Launch and Recovery Equipment
Aircraft Launch and Recovery Equipment
Management Program
Automated Shot and Recovery Log
Availability Work Package
Budget Enforcement Act of 1990
Budget Estimate Submissions









Commander, Naval Air Forces, Atlantic
Commander, Naval Air Forces, Pacific
Congressional Research Service
Current Ship's Maintenance Project




















Department ofDefense Financial Management
Regulation
Effective Full Power Hours
Extended Ship Work Breakdown Structure
Flying Hour Program
Office of Budget (Navy)
Fleet Replacement Squadrons
Future Years Defense Plan
General Accounting Office
Global Cooperative Initiatives Account
Independent Steaming Exercises
Immediate Superior In the Chain of Command
Naval Aviation Depot
Naval Air Systems Command
Operations and Maintenance
Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund
Office of Management and Budget
Organizational Maintenance Management System






























Service Change Installation Program
Ship's Force Work Package
Ship's Intermediate Maintenance Activity
Selected Restricted Availability
Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair
Tailored Ship's Training Availability
Type Commander








APPENDIX B. AIRCRAFT CARRIER UNDERWAY DAYS
CY97 Jan Feb March April May June July August Sept Oct Nov Dec
CVN65 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 17 14 0 13
CV67 0 10 18 2 25 19 16 20 25 23 0 5
CVN69 3 4 13 13 8 11 12 13 15 0 16 13
CVN 71 17 20 24 25 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CVN73 0 0 15 11 20 25 0 14 4 28 20 27
CVN74 15 0 12 7 7 12 8 17 0 14 20 0
CY98
CVN65 10 9 15 15 3 10 16 21 12 5 24 27
CV67 0 0 0 10 17 7 14 20 10 10 0 10
CVN69 3 19 5 4 6 20 20 19 20 27 25 10
CVN 71 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 9 12 14 19 18
CVN73 26 26 21 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CVN74 19 6 26 25 20 30 22 24 0 0 0 0
CY99
CVN65 16 23 23 30 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CV67 6 0 10 20 0 20 22 0 12 26 21 24
CVN69 0 0 0 0 0 12 16 13 10 24 0 15
CVN 71 0 27 5 30 25 20 21 31 14 0 4 0
CVN73 0 0 10 1 10 10 2 15 10 16 3 6
CVN75 5 3 15 0 0 0 0 6 14 9 3 12
CYOO
CVN65 3 10 13 8 11 16 13 10 12 7 8 6
CV67 23 19 14 3 13 6 11 0 0 0 0 12
CVN69 8 11 25 17 21 21 26 11 0 0 11 11
CVN 71 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 3 13 12 6 7
CVN73 6 7 28 7 14 9 27 21 30 24 16 15
CVN75 5 10 13 4 17 10 6 24 0 15 3 26
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APPENDIX C. CVW DEPLOYED PMR EXECUTION
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APPENDIXD. AUTOMATED SHOT AND RECOVERY LOG
(FY98)
CV97
DATE 62 63 64 65 fiT 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75
JANUARY 307 1,789 1,099 133 NOFO 102 43 79 n2 46 8RA 2,164
FEB 968 1,383 1,307 NOFO 687 2,307 44 ,::NQf.O" 1,666 127 91 NOFO
MARCH 1,121 n4 NOFO NOFO 1,486 NOFO ~::.;:' 1;$74'; :NQFO: 2,027 1,803 1,007 1,063
APRIL 1,006 267 1,448 NOFO 216 1,492 935 NOFO 1,755 NOFO 748 ::"704,"
MAY 1,2n NOFO 1,765 NOFO 1,947 1,3n 414 NOFO L>l$Q. 920 ;(~QOP' 320
JUNE 571 NOFO 1,612 NOFO 1,437 970 901 NOFO NOFO 1,012 1,880 IIJULY 5 NOFO 2,060 NOFO 1,217 2,008 1,626 NOFO NOFO 1,531 NOFOAUGUST 393 NOFO 1,620 538 !/1.,~.: NOFO 974 NOFO NOFO 38 1,667 123
SEPT 1,396 NOFO 788 2,299 i'/'.@(l;; 998 517 NOFO 1,388 270 NOFO
OCT 942 NOFO NOFO 1,460 .{·',m~ 1,736 NOFO 8 NOFO 853 2,056 1,108 110
NOV 813 NOFO 701 t:. NOFO 1,443 1,419 703 NOFO 623 1,595 1,912 90DEC SD NOFO 453 Iii ,'., 114 1,914 563 340 NOFO 1,653 1,720 NOFO
TOTAL 8,799 4,213 12,853 4,191 I 11,253 13,649 9,491 1,647 6,370 9,994 14,034 9,290 323
CV98
DATE 62 63 64 65 fiT 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75
JANUARY 611 103 NOFO 1,380 NOFO 2,076 347 439 NOFO NOFO 1,653 1,042 106
FEB 1,815 NOFO NOFO 190 NOFO n':':~:i';,; 1,737 557 NOFO 657 1,498 NOFO
MARCH 1,598 NOFO NOFO 1,936 16 ~~f 427 2,443 NOFO 1,081 484 552
APRIL 1,450 278 NOFO 1,182 67 i!\~: 472 359 ~d<~~::: 1,852 112 2,505
MAY 937 1,285 NOFO NOFO 2,080 i:~,; 512 767 '::\~:' 5 40 2,094
JUNE 109 280 NOFO 1,892 :;::;.j'~;(1 RCOH 1,485 549 10 1,754 NOFO 2,543 34
JULY 925 NOFO 1,568 769 RCOH ·1,789 2,338 236 1,317 NOFO 1,028
AUGUST 3n 52 1,592 1,620 RCOH 1,782 382 483 2,077 NOFO 517 700
SEPT NOFO 1,506 1,283 i;,'li02a RCOH 1,696 N~FQ 611 2,165 NOFO NOFO 754
OCT 2,340 860 379 1,566 RCOH 2,007 NOFO 492 1,559 NOFO NOFO 175
NOV 906 1,822 1,279 NOFO RCOH 1,300 1,283 1,236 608 NOFO NOFO 1,219
DEC NOFO 702 1,788 1,528 RCOH 213 i:;250:{~ 752 ~:'\<'~!l):'; .:, NOFO NOFO 1,082
TOTAL 6,520 6,494 4,942 14,469 9,437 2,326 13,767 9,367 4,515 13,325 3,7ffT 10,281 4,070
FV1998 3248 2712 13943 6707 7419 12229 8885 2035 14037 9158 13301 1794
RED
°
0 0 250 7,419 6752 0 0 7313 9118 9239
°BLUE
°
2207 2920 0 0
°
1324 0 657 0 0 0
GREEN
°





PURPLE 3145 453 n07 1538 0 5477 7561 2035 6067 40 4062 1454
LEGE~ TOTAL CNAP CNAL
RED Gulf Deploy 95468 49602 45866
BLUE FRSfTRACQ 40091 23971 16120




=Estimated Value 39539 21288 18251
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APPENDIX E. AUTOMATED SHOT AND RECOVERY LOG
(FY99-00)
CY99
DATE 63 64 65-0 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75
JANUARY 324 304 1,373 372 COH NOFO 2,160 NOFO 1,010 NOFO NOFO 486
FEB NOFO 1,216 1,867 NOFO COH NOFO 1,718 1,605 NOFO 50 NOFO 240
MARCH 2,615 1,058 1,703 1,570 COH NOFO 1,692 233 1.193 399 9 761
APRIL 1,236 598 1,277 1,878 COH NOFO 915 863 NOFO NOFO 1,177 NOFO
MAY 2,001 1,334 166 NOFO COH 29 124 932 NOFO 1,165 134 NOFO
JUNE 2,032 1,186 9 1,718 COH 689 ~1f 829 NOFO 1,509 884 NOFOJULY 1,546 1,331 NOFO 1,978 COH 1,067 199 NOFO 7 658 NOFOAUGUST 770 1,813 NOFO NOFO COH 255 18 1,094 NOFO 1,236 2,128 421
SEPT NOFO 2,150 NOFO 384 COH 640 ",' };~j 251 352 488 ;'<i'~r·.·'· 479
OCT 1,140 2,350 NOFO 2,218 COH 1,834 NOFO NOFO 196 599 1,660 829
NOV 874 1,568 NOFO 1,302 COH NOFO NOFO NOFO 1,735 9 1,616 183
DEC NOFO 792 54 ~::;:. COH 1,361 NOFO NOFO NOFO 1,273 165 1,274
TOTAL 12,538 15,700 6,449 12.620 0 5,875 7,827 6,006 4,486 6,735 9,031 4,673
CYOO
DATE 63 64 65-0 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75
JANUARY NOFO 236 14 2,465 COH 317 NOFO NOFO 1,313 428 1,256 246
FEB 817 956 754 '2(tl;~~,~; COH 606 NOFO NOFO 856 260 1,628 842
MARCH 357 NOFO 854 382 COH 2,106 NOFO NOFO 218 2,920 2,602 914
APRIL 1,397 4 563 NOFO COH 1,345 NOFO NOFO 1,846 447 2,689 12
MAY 1,691 543 1,631 782 COH 1,342 NOFO NOFO 1,125 1,357 2,048 1,336
JUNE 334 915 899 166 COH 1,948 NOFO 9 1,645 581 684 644
JULY NOFO 928 23 ii,l;p@' COH 1,620 NOFO NOFO 1,250 1,742 NOFO 610
AUGUST NOFO 252 948 NOFO COH 225 88 1 957 1,600 NOFO 2,059
SEPT 680 838 1,309 NOFO COH NOFO 146 948 1,618 1,832 NOFO 10
OCT 2,333 2,165 215 NOFO COH NOFO 558 NO 1,843 2,412 NOFO 1,267
NOV 947 749 735 NOFO COH 341 1,018 NO 1,953 1,250 NOFO 318
DEC NOFO 1,739 443 NOFO COH 1,111 NO NO 1,850 484 NOFO 1,246











13no 14374 9841 10994 RCOH 6200 9360 8486 4972 4854 5590
10200 6480 9453 384 0 3520 8142 4401 2417 0 0
0 1300 0 3466 0 0 1218 0 2203 3169 2661
0 860 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1236 0
3570 5734 388 7144 0 2651 0 4085 352 449 2920
7,290 9382 7049 11635 RCOH 12704 234 958 12759 13048 14348
0 4710 0 9187 0 9192 0 0 2575 5755 10907
0 3873 0 0 0 0 0 0 218 688 3441
0 0 4332 0 0 0 0 948 1846 599 0
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APPENDIX F. ORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL MATERIAL COSTS
CoI1.1T111 CoIlm12 CoIlm13 CoIlm14
0= $1,061,003.69 100'10 $1,061,003.69
p= $130,945.82 100'10 $130,945.82
c= $169,070.32 100'10 $169,070.32
w= $77,528.79 100'10 $77,528.79
TOTAl..= $1,4381548:62
PERlOOIarY - DAYS : 180
SORTlE COlM': " 10,000
SORTlE COST: $143.85
Cost Per Sortie - Contains~ : Tdal ccst lsortie
Calcu1atioos:
CoI1.1T111 - Contains groop categayfran nctes aWIe.
CoI1.1T112 - Contains SJb-tot.als from ea::h IJI.O"I<stet
CoII.1T11 3 - Contains fOOT1Jla in rdes ctoJe for carputirg
cnma furx:lirg ~Lirerrents. Pdjustrrents cal be rra:le
ctf cJ sortie co..nts tased 00 ship's op s::he:lule.
CoI1.1T114 - Contains calaJlatioo tdals
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Notes:
0- Contains all iterrs that are driven I}j CIl q:aational coont e.terl if
utilizEd durirg a rraintenarreevolutioo. (10,OCO &:rties)
p - Cmtans all iterrs that ere PNSdriven <:the" then "R' ctlEd<
iterrs driven I}j operatialaI coonts. (6 rrarths cJ PNS)
C - Contains all CO'TEdive rreintenarre items irdudirg repcirs cr1d
replcm Ients cJ tools used to perform rraintenarre. (611'Tl1ths
CXlITErlive ard~ 00%an..a ccst)
w-Contains iterrs that either affa:t CJeN health and Y.elf'are, cr a-e
la:lUired for adrrinistrative su~dea1liness. (6 rrooths
adrrinislrative and~x 00% annual ccst)
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APPENDIXG. ALRE COST OF OWNERSHIP
I Cost I Number of I Cost '
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APPENDIXH. MATERIAL INFLATION INDEX
ALRE COST OF DOING BUSINESS
Per 10K Sorties
Nomenclature NSN 1995 Cost 2000 Cost Avg Use Avg Cost(1995) Avg Cost (2000)
Catapult Cables 1710-01-292-9873 $1,800.00 $1,617.66 8 $14,400.00 $12,941.2E
Shuttle Assy 1720-01-158-1698 $34,641.00 $59,000.00 2 $69,282.00 $118,000.OC
S-3 Holdback 1720-01-022-6299 $965.00 $1,943.00 6 $5,790.00 $11,658.0C
S-3 T-bar 1720-00-492-0806 $41.52 $64.19 1320 $54,806.40 $84,730.8C
A-6 Holdback 1720-01-064-6070 $999.91 $1,352.92 8 $7,999.28 $10,823.3€
A-6 T-bar 1720-00-869-5453 $8.50 $18.78 1320 $11,220.00 $24,789.6C
RRRB F-14 1730-01-250-2685 $4,930.00 $8,350.00 18 $88,740.00 $150,300.00
RRRB F-18 1720-01-163-6062 $3,364.00 $4,880.00 14 $47,096.00 $68,320.00
Cat Lube Oil 9150-00-753-4937 $207.25 $165.00 240 $49,740.00 $39,600.00
Purchase Cable 1710-00-102-7796 $2,467.00 $9,125.00 8 $19,736.00 $73,000.00
CDP (110') 1710-00-050-8872 $2,467.00 $8,700.00 75 $185,025.00 $652,500.00
Wire Support 1710-00-626-3917 $90.00 $162.50 200 $18,000.00 $32,500.00
Piston (ModO/1) 1720-00-111-5527 $1,085.00 $2,617.41 4 $4,340.00 $10,469.64
Guide (ModO/1) 1720-00-939-0113 $1,733.00 $1,733.00 4 $6,932.00 $6,932.00
Connector (L) 1720-00-130-7453 $5,757.00 $7,305.87 4 $23,028.00 $29,223.48
Connector (R) 1720-00-130-7454 $5,543.00 $7,104.17 4 $22,172.00 $28,416.68
Choke Ring 1720-00-476-0009 $600.00 $1,273.00 6 $3,600.00 $7,638.00
Barrel Nuts 5310-01-322-8047 $35.00 $105.31 350 $12,250.00 $36,858.50
Ret. Bar Bolts 5306-01-420-7844 $8.00 $34.74 250 $2,000.00 $8,685.00
H-block Bolts 5306-01-275-4002 $5.00 $14.07 100 $500.00 $1,407.00
Total: $646,656.68 $1,408,793.34
Cost increase for 10k sorties: $762,137 % Increase = 117.86%
Per sortie increase: $76.21 IRR= 16.9%
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APPENDIX I. VAMOSC ALRE COST DATA (FY97-98)
FY1997
M'estirg krestirg Gea" caapJt QdapJt CalapJt la'drg LalCIrg Ladrg
Gea"Latxr M'estirg GeaI CNerheacI Latxr IIItderia CNert1el:D SjsIsTs SjsIsTs SjsIsTsIVbI:eI'ia CeSs MieriaI CMrileacICeSs CeSs CeSs CeSs Ccsts LatxrCcsts Q)sts CeSs
4U,tltt l:/,0Il: ::B,1a
OJ~ 6,43: 1,62f 6,77C 100,00: 216,1~ 115,00: 7,83. 53,43'1 9,2l!
:.:u,LJI I 17,ooe ZT,fEi. 3:14,82! 2T3,ZX E,441 -38,85i .~ ~::l'I"
IC,V.(l6)
Il.VoW:I7 119,41~ Z57,lQ:: ~,ffi 131,O:f :.Dl,~ 249,87 9,n 18,48< ll,li:i<1
bl,~ lU<;1l:/1 l:lS,L4l: ltll,41t jfL,LLI ::fX),7'5::. 4,22: 8,33< tl,Ud..
14,l:/IIt 1,~' 13,m 77,19/ 183,046 ..7O;9X aJ,12: :.D,~ L4,~
14,3!l "ZiJ,f51 ZT,'3Ji 12,671: 25,1~ 24,00' 5,B:?f 11,581: 11,071:
:.D,W ~,ll:/i ;;f>,!:ti ~ 1b,4tll:: 2,721 7'5i 4::: !H
I ...... ' rvv, Ll:S, Il:/I b(,l~ 54,~ 67,578 134,21t -128;27 4T,fCI w,:xx: l:l!d,41
~,'OT;. ai,41~ 46,14:i 44,191 4O,ffi'i 51,22i 18,34/ 4,127 'Z2,T~
B,lli: tb,l4t ~7U: W,~ 11l:/,4a 171,~ 34,ffi: lX3,::B1 tX>,4l:l:
1,lUI 2,1~ 2,1CI ffi,741: 132,551 ~ 4a: 79: fO/I
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APPENDIXJ. VAMOSC ALRE COST DATA (FY99-00)
FY1~
M'estirg ItmlstirgQg- ~ ~ ~ Ladrg La'drg LatlrgJrrnlStirgQa ~ ~GD"Laxr IIIimiaI ass C»erheKt Laxr MmiaI 0fert&I:I ~ IIIimiaI C»erheKtQEils ass ass ass ass Laxrass ass ass
C>JaIi3
1(B,~ .aD,ax l:I:l,78i <ffi,Cii <ffi,::fi: 2ffi,EH 8,llC 1,71C 9,47.<
IIJIoUJ:)( lU:VH 3l:l,3! ZE,{)l 148,fff 192,lli 2ffi,42f :i),14/ ffi,OX ti:i,04/
il.,~ ;m,.I:l.I/ 44,Z&. 1<xxrn: 1,::m,lU 1~l:U: ~7?i 51,221 11,lH
19,61~ 7,11C '31,7lf 129,lZ 1~31~ 249,~ ~!Bi 2,ro: 13,351
~lff 41,3a: 4Q07( E):l.,41~ 221,16: 151,61E
'1 74,1~ :I:E,171 142,tB' 97,33' 137,24: 187,5I 4,17.: ts,lJ/K.
79,12/ 113,~ 148,22"1 l1Q<ti 4B' 171~
'Lf,t!I:i:. l~b7t 53,tffI b7,~ :i),~ 13J,!:B< 7;Jli. 1,S« lb,LIt
310,171 ;:uq.,ttt 4:l4,33i fX6,0lE 452,44: lliS,bJ' 11~():f .~ 1~7.<f.
lQ01~ 1,92t 19,29: 51,r:s:. 31,91 lCB,9:fI 7,51' 37E 14,4/L
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